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1. INTRODUCTION
The federal judiciary, since its establishment in 1789, has been vested
with authority to review state cases, criminal as well as civil, when a con-
trolling issue of federal law is involved. In the beginning that power could be
exercised solely through review in the United States Supreme Court of final
state judgments.' The constitutionality of that federal power in relation to
state criminal cases was authoritatively settled in 1821 in Cohens v. Virginia.2
That arrangement for federal control over the state criminal process has re-
mained unimpaired, at least formally, to the present.3
The enactment in 1867 of an amendment to the federal habeas corpus
statutes opened a new possibility for federal judicial review of state criminal
cases. 4 The statute authorized federal trial courts to issue writs of habeas
corpus on behalf of any person in custody "in violation of the constitution,"
even though the detention was at the hands of state and not federal author-
ities.' The potential of this statute was not realized for nearly a century. It had
little effect on the relationship of federal courts with the state judicial process
until the middle of the twentieth century. Then the tidy, symmetrical ar-
rangement of direct Supreme Court review following promptly on the heels of
state supreme courts' affirmation of convictions began to be unsettled by a
series of decisions interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute. The series
culminated in a trilogy of cases in 1963, which created a wholly new scheme
for federal review of state criminal cases.6
Under the scheme established by these Supreme Court decisions, the
federal district courts became the principal means through which the federal
judiciary exercised its authority over the state criminal process. Although the
Supreme Court's power to review final state criminal judgments remained in
place, as a practical matter it became almost surplusage; the real power was
transferred to the trial level of the federal judiciary. Under the 1963 decisions,
the federal district courts were empowered to review any alleged federal
constitutional defect in the process leading to a state criminal conviction,
* James Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.S., Auburn University 1949; J.D., Univer-
sity of Alabama 1951; LL.M., Harvard University 1954.
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
2. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
4. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)).
5. Id. at 385.
6. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963).
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whether or not it had been raised in the state proceeding and whether or not it
had been passed upon by the state courts. Federal district courts were em-
powered to hold de novo evidentiary hearings on any such alleged federal
violations. This sweeping authority substantially altered the relationship
between the federal judiciary and the state courts in criminal cases. It is the
kind of shift that one would ordinarily assume to be of a legislative character,
involving institutional rearrangements and delicate policy judgments concern-
ing federalism. This arrangement has been the subject of controversy and
lively debate for twenty years.
Two circumstances provided practical justification for this arrangement.
One was the Supreme Court's lack of capacity to afford meaningful review in
all the state criminal cases in which that review was necessary to assure
observance of the federal constitution. This incapacity resulted from the
Supreme Court's swollen docket and the increase of state criminal business
involving federal questions. The other was the felt necessity, in light of the
inadequacy of many state records, to provide a federal forum in which the
evidentiary record concerning the alleged violation could be fully developed.
What made these circumstances increasingly compelling was the rapid
growth in the number of federal constitutional questions that could arise in
state criminal cases. This growth was the product of Supreme Court interpre-
tations of the fourteenth amendment. In turn, this proliferation of possible
federal questions meant that a greatly increased percentage of state criminal
convictions could be subjected to Supreme Court review. Thus, in sheer
quantity, the number of cases began to outrun the capacity of the Supreme
Court. Many of these newly emerging federal questions depended heavily on
the facts. Not surprisingly, the state criminal process was not always attuned
to a full development of such facts; nor were state trial judges always oriented
to making the sort of detailed factual findings that would permit meaningful
Supreme Court review on direct appeal. Yet, as in all direct appellate review,
the Supreme Court was limited to the state record. In 1963 the Supreme Court
apparently believed the answer to both of these difficulties-lack of quantita-
tive capacity in the Supreme Court and the inadequacy of state records-lay
in opening the federal district courts to the review of state criminal cases.
In the 1970s, Supreme Court decisions began to modify this arrangement.
Now procedural defaults in the state courts may more readily foreclose the
availability of federal habeas corpus 7 and access to the writ on search and
seizure claims is narrower than it was." However, the review structure
stemming from the 1963 decisions remains essentially in place, and it con-
tinues to draw criticism. 9
7. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); cf. United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
8. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
9. Among the more frequently cited criticisms are Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Desmond, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State
Court Convictions-Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAH L. REV. 18 (1964); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 142 (1970).
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The critics acknowledge that when there is a substantial claim of federal
constitutional violation in a state criminal prosecution the convicted defen-
dant should have access to a federal court for review of that claim. The
existing habeas corpus arrangement for accomplishing that review is crit-
icized, however, on the grounds that the federal review process has no ter-
minal point and that it unduly undermines the integrity of state procedure. In
short, these criticisms stem from concerns about finality, efficiency, and state
authority.
Those who defend the existing scheme stress the two circumstances that
produced it-the lack of capacity in the Supreme Court to provide meaningful
review and the necessity of a federal forum in which evidentiary hearings can
be conducted on the federal claims. Some who endorse the existing arrange-
ments also argue that in the adjudication of federal claims state judges cannot
be regarded with the same confidence as can federal judges and that there is
even value in "redundant" litigation.' °
Efforts have been made over the years to persuade Congress to alter this
review scheme. Recently proposals have been advanced to broaden the
federal writ by, for example, legislatively overruling the holding in Stone v.
Powell. " Most of the legislative proposals, however, have been aimed at
narrowing the writ by giving a heightened res judicata effect to state convic-
tions and by establishing a statute of limitations on the availability of federal
habeas corpus review. ' 2 These latter proposals have been resisted by those
who see any move in those directions as eroding federal judicial protection in
relation to federal constitutional rights in state criminal cases. Politically, the
matter appears to be at dead center; although there is considerable sentiment
behind various proposals, the opposition to each suggested change is suffi-
cient to prevent its enactment.
The thesis of this article is that there is a way out of this impasse, that it is
possible to design a structure and a procedure to provide a meaningful federal
review of state convictions and a substantial measure of finality while simul-
taneously eliminating inefficient, duplicative, and protracted litigation. A
large part of the present difficulty lies in the collateral nature of the federal
review scheme, a review of the state conviction that is unrelated in terms of
time and procedure to the state process. Orderly procedure, efficiency, and
finality can all be served by restructuring the federal review system to link it
back to the conclusion of the state process. To do this without eroding federal
protection for any constitutional rights requires that the new system be de-
10. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-31 (1977). The Supreme Court's deci-
sions in the 1963 trilogy were probably based in part on lack of confidence in state judges. See Meador, The
Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REV. 286, 290-93 (1966).
11. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus after Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only for the
Arguably Innocent?, I I U. RICH. L. REV. 291,327-31 (1977); Green, Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the
Burger Court, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655, 673-77 (1977).
12. The most recent proposals to this effect were introduced in the 97th Congress with the support of the
Department of Justice. Hearings on S. 653 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1981) (testimony of Jonathan Rose).
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signed to overcome the conditions that gave rise to the present arrangement,
namely, that there be an adequate federal appellate capacity to handle all state
criminal cases on direct review and that there be arrangements for federal
evidentiary hearings when appropriate.
The desired objectives can be achieved and the pitfalls avoided through
authorization of direct appellate review of state convictions in the existing
United States courts of appeals or in a new federal appellate tribunal, with
careful attention given to procedural detail. This system would provide an
adequate federal appellate capacity to make that federal review as effective as
existing habeas corpus review. To accomplish this, the federal appellate
courts would need to have two powers unfamiliar in American appellate prac-
tice-the authority to undertake a searching review of the case, passing on
issues not raised below, and the authority to dispatch a case temporarily to a
district court for an evidentiary hearing. In effect this new style of review
would combine traditional appellate review with collateral review, thereby
eliminating the existing fragmented review process.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT
A. Use of Existing Courts of Appeals
There are several advantages to using the twelve regional courts of
appeals as the primary federal forums for reviewing state convictions contain-
ing federal questions: the burden would not be unduly heavy on any one
federal court; responsibility would be placed in a federal court in the region of
the state where the conviction was obtained; the reviewing forum would
contain at least some judges from the state where the prosecution took place;
and there would be no need to create any new tribunals. There is no constitu-
tional impediment to authorizing direct appellate review of state supreme
court judgments in forums other than the Supreme Court. As Hamilton wrote
in the 82d Federalist:
I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the
state courts, to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending
the power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish the motives to the
multiplication of federal courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated to
contract the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. 13
It has sometimes been suggested that state supreme court justices might
take umbrage at having their judgments reviewed by any federal forum short
of the United States Supreme Court. The answer to that, of course, is that
under the present arrangement state supreme court judgments are being re-
viewed by United States district courts, the lowest tier of the federal system--
courts presided over by a single judge. In comparison, there could hardly be
any ground for discontent among the state justices if their judgments were
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 379--80 (A. Hamilton) (Hallowell ed. 1842).
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reviewed by a higher federal court, a United States court of appeals, sitting in
a panel of three judges. If necessary to heighten the dignity of the federal
forum still more, the courts of appeals could be authorized by statute in those
cases to sit in panels of five judges.
This idea was first put forward publicly by the National Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in the report of its Courts Task Force
published in 1973.14 The proposal has made little headway, however, largely
because of lack of understanding of the procedures that would go with such a
direct appellate review. These procedures are outlined below.
One concern about this proposal relates to the added work load that it
would place on the already heavily burdened United States courts of appeals.
It is difficult to project the exact dimensions of this added load. Statistics are
simply not kept in a way that makes reliable projection possible. A rough
indication may be gleaned from the number of habeas corpus petitions now
filed annually in the federal district courts throughout the country and by
taking into account, in addition, the number of certiorari petitions filed in the
United States Supreme Court in state criminal cases.
According to the latest available statistics from the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, the total number of habeas corpus petitions filed
annually by convicted state defendants in the federal district courts in all the
circuits is as follows: "5
Circuit Habeas Corpus Petitions
1st 125
2nd 663
3d 484
4th 1104
5th' 6  2348
6th 860
7th 658
8th 373
9th 851
10th 300
D.C. 24
Total 7790
These figures are likely, however, to give an overblown picture of the
number of cases that would be taken annually from the state supreme courts
in these circuits to the courts of appeals. These habeas corpus petitions in-
14. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS. REPORT
ON COURTS 129-31 (1973).
15. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OFTHE UNITED STATES-ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE DIRECTOR 369-74 (1981).
16. This designation includes the I Ith Circuit, which was created after the period covered by these statis-
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clude numerous cases originating several years earlier, cases in which the
time for seeking direct appellate review would have expired. There is no way
to know what proportion of these petitions falls into that category. The
probability is that at least a third would be foreclosed. The number, of course,
depends on the time limits set for seeking review in the United States court of
appeals from the state supreme courts. These figures must also be discounted
by the number of cases in which review has previously been sought and
denied in the Supreme Court; that number also cannot be ascertained from
available data. In any event, the figures shown above are undoubtedly higher
than the number of cases that would come directly to the United States courts
of appeals under the suggested arrangement.
To these figures must be added the number of cases in which convicted
state defendants now seek direct United States Supreme Court review of the
state supreme courts' affirmance of their convictions or of collateral attacks
on their convictions. During the 1981 Term of the Supreme Court these cases
totalled 731. 17 The source of the petitions-that is, the states from which the
cases came-cannot be ascertained from readily available information. One
could arbitrarily divide the number of cases by twelve to give an average
number of sixty-one per circuit. However, that is undoubtedly inaccurate; the
larger circuits are likely to have a larger number of state criminal cases within
their borders. Perhaps a more reasonable way of estimating the number of
such cases in each circuit would be to allocate them in proportion to the
number of habeas corpus petitions filed in the district courts of each circuit.
Whatever the precise magnitude of the addition to the courts of appeals'
case loads, some additional judgeships will be required on those courts.
Because of the difficulty in estimating the dimensions of this new appellate
business, it is difficult to estimate the number of these judgeships. However,
it should be borne in mind that this arrangement brings no net increase to
federal judicial business viewed as a whole. Its major thrust is to transfer the
business from the district courts and the Supreme Court to the courts of
appeals. This will have the salutary effect of relieving the beleaguered
Supreme Court to some extent and of obviating the necessity of increasing the
number of district judgeships to the same extent that they would otherwise
have to be increased. In the long run, therefore, the additional circuit judge-
ships will not add any significant costs to the federal judicial system. Indeed,
the arrangement will have the benefits outlined above, which, for the country
as a whole, and for the state and federal judicial systems in particular, will
outweigh any potential costs.
B. Use of a New Federal Appellate Tribunal
Since the early 1970s proposals have been advanced for the creation of a
new federal appellate court to be positioned between the regional courts of
17. Letter from the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to Daniel J. Meador (Jan. 27, 1983).
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appeals and the Supreme Court. There are numerous ways in which such a
court might be constituted and its jurisdiction structured. The Freund Com-
mittee proposal in 197218 was quite different from that of the Hruska Commis-
sion in 1975.'9 Proposals recently pending in the House and the Senate differ
as well. 20 At hearings held in the Senate in 1981 and 1982, several other
variations were advanced concerning the creation of such a tribunal. 2' Even
the suggested names are different. The earliest and most often used name is
"National Court of Appeals." In more recent years, however, names such as
"Inter-Circuit Court of Appeals" 22 and "Multi-Circuit Panel"' 3 have been
advanced.
Despite the variations in all of these matters, sentiment seems to be
growing for the establishment of such a tribunal. The court would be sub-
ordinate to the Supreme Court but would occupy a tier above the courts of
appeals. There is a high degree of agreement among those who favor the
creation of such a court that it should have jurisdiction to hear and decide on
the merits any case referred to it by the Supreme Court. This "reference
jurisdiction" would make the court a kind of "overflow chamber" for the
Supreme Court; it would provide substantial additional appellate capacity at
the top of the federal system, thus enabling the federal system as a whole to
deliver a larger number of definitive decisions on questions of federal law with
nationwide binding effect. In addition to the reference jurisdiction, the court
could be given some measure of direct appellate jurisdiction. Proposals to that
effect have been advanced from several quarters. 24
If Congress should create such an appellate court, state criminal cases
would be a promising prospect for its direct appellate jurisdiction. This court
would be the only federal forum to which a state criminal case could be
brought following a final judgment of the highest state court. This arrange-
ment would provide a single federal forum with nationwide jurisdiction. Pro-
posals to this effect have been advanced by Judge Clement F. Haynsworth,
18. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1972).
19. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975).
20. S. 2035, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 4762, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); S. 1529, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981).
21. Hearings on S. 2035 Before tie Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Court Reform Legislation: Hearings on S. 1529 Before the Subcomm. on Courts ofthe
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981).
22. H.R. 4762, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Intercircuit Tribunal of the United States Courts of Appeals);
-Hearings on S. 2035 Before The Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. - (1982) (testimony of Daniel J. Meador) (Inter-Circuit Court of Appeals); Levin, Adding
Appellate Capacity to the Federal System: A National Court ofAppeals or an Inter-Circuit Tribunal, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1, 16-21 (1982) (Inter-Circuit Tribunal).
23. Leventhal, A Modest Proposalfor a Multi-Circuit Court ofAppeals, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 881,882 (1975).
24. v Hearings on S. 2035 Before The Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. - (1982) (testimony of Daniel J. Meador); Court Reform Legislation: Hear-
ings on S. 1529 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
86-120 (1981) (testimony ofJohn H. Pickering, John P. Frank, James D. Cameron, Clement F. Haynsworth, and
Erwin N. Griswold).
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Jr. 25 and Justice James Duke Cameron. 26 This arrangement has some advan-
tages over the proposal outlined above to use the existing regional courts of
appeals.
The main advantage of this arrangement would be the measure of nation-
wide uniformity that it would bring to the system. The same tribunal would
pass on all federal constitutional questions arising in state criminal proceed-
ings. Thus the law could be kept on an even keel, and its development could
be monitored more effectively. Concentrating review of state criminal cases
in a single forum would also alleviate pressure on the Supreme Court. If state
criminal cases are routed to twelve different regional appellate courts, the
Supreme Court is still left in the business of monitoring the work of those
twelve courts in order to resolve conflicting decisions among the circuits.
With a single appellate court those problems are eliminated, although the
Supreme Court would still have a certiorari jurisdiction over the new appel-
late court's decisions in order to preserve the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of federal constitutional questions.
For the reasons stated earlier, it is difficult to predict the volume of
business that would come to the new court under this arrangement. The
statistics set out above showing the number of habeas corpus petitions filed
annually in the federal district courts and the number of state criminal cases in
which direct Supreme Court review is sought are the most pertinent data
available. As explained above, they do not provide a basis for precise predic-
tions. Whatever the total caseload would be for the twelve regional courts of
appeals, if the state cases were routed to this new appellate court that entire
caseload would instead be concentrated there. Although this quantity of cases
seems large for any appellate court, the caseload would be manageable if
procedures within the court are properly designed and administered.
III. PROCEDURES
Whether one uses the existing courts of appeals or a newly created appel-
late court, the central feature of either proposal is that all state criminal cases
must seek initial entry into the federal judicial system at an intermediate
appellate level, not at the district court level or at the Supreme Court level.
The procedures through which such a federal review would be administered
would be essentially the same whether the existing courts of appeals are used
or a new appellate court is used. A brief outline of these procedures follows.
The procedures must be designed to make the appellate review coexten-
sive in scope with the review presently available on habeas corpus. That is,
25. Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate System. 59
CORNELL L. REV. 597, 604-07 (1974).
26. Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, and a Proposal for a National Court of
Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545. 558-74.
[Vol. 44:273
FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE CRIMINAL CASES
the appellate court must be able to reach all federal issues that the district
courts can presently reach on habeas corpus and must be able to obtain
federal evidentiary hearings when necessary. The procedures must have a
terminal point, bringing to the system a measure of finality now lacking. The
procedures must also be designed to assure that the federal issues receive
meaningful review within a reasonable time so that neither do unacceptable
backlogs develop nor does review become an empty formality.
To match the scope of review currently available on habeas corpus in the
federal district courts, the appellate court must be vested with powers un-
familiar in American appellate practice. The reach of the district courts'
authority under the 1963 trilogy is sweeping: on habeas corpus a district court
can reach any alleged federal constitutional violation in the state criminal
process, even if the question has not been litigated in the state courts. This
power was recently modified through a judicially developed waiver doc-
trine-a convicted defendant who did not raise the federal question in the
state courts must now show cause for that failure and prejudice from the
federal violation in order to obtain federal habeas review. 27 However, this
modification still leaves a relatively far-reaching power in the district courts to
pass on federal questions that otherwise are not presently open for review on
direct appeal from the conviction. Thus, to install a system of direct appellate
review in a federal forum the appellate forum must have the same authority.
In other words, the federal appellate court must not be strictly limited to
reviewing "the record" in the case, as is traditional in American appellate
practice. Rather, it must have authority to review "the case," including all
federal issues. This is an appellate power similar to that exercised in the Court
of Appeal of England; that court can consider issues not raised below and may
receive fresh evidence bearing on those issues.28
It is essential that the federal appellate court have these powers in order
to be able to reach all potential federal defects in the conviction and thus
obviate the need for collateral review. Indeed, not only should the federal
appellate court have these powers, but it should be directed to examine the
case affirmatively and to ferret out all potential federal violations, subject
only to the waiver and forfeiture doctrines mentioned above. The convicted
defendant and his counsel should be required to complete an exhaustive
check list of federal constitutional defects that might appear in state criminal
cases and either assert an argument supporting such a defect or expressly
waive any assertion of the point. The normal assumptions of the adversary
process should not be left to operate unaided; the court must take an affirma-
tive hand to flush out any possible federal claims that might later work to undo
27. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
28. D.J. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS: ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORMS 71-75,97-98
(1973).
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the conviction on habeas corpus.29 Only by giving the appellate court such a
scope of review and such a duty to search the case affirmatively can direct
appellate review replace the collateral review now available in the district
courts.
When the federal appellate court discovers a possible federal constitu-
tional defect of arguable merit, the court must have the power to obtain a
federal evidentiary hearing if the state record is not already adequate to
enable the court to pass soundly on the merits of the point. A workable
procedure for obtaining such an evidentiary hearing can be developed by
authorizing the court of appeals to dispatch the case to the federal district
court with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing on the specified point and
then to transmit the record of that hearing to the appellate court. Meanwhile,
the case can be stayed on the appellate docket. When the appellate court
receives the federal district court record of the evidentiary hearing and the
findings of the district court, it.can then proceed to decide the case on its
merits.
Available data indicate that there are relatively few habeas corpus peti-
tions that require evidentiary hearings. A study in the District of Massachu-
setts showed that hearings were held in 10 to 12 percent of all petitions.
Another study surveying six federal districts showed that hearings of all
kinds, including legal arguments, case conferences, and evidentiary hearings,
were held in only 6.2 percent of the cases; the evidentiary hearings were
characterized in this study as "exceptional."'" Thus, this procedure should
impose no great burden on either the appellate court or the district court.
Whatever time might be consumed in the transmittal down and back would
likely, in the long run, be less than that now required through the dual,
inefficient system of collateral review.
In light of the additional case load that this state criminal business will
bring to whatever federal appellate court or courts may be employed, the
procedures through which review is carried out must be tailored to enable the
appellate court to provide a genuine scrutiny on the merits of the federal
claims, and yet enable the court to dispose of cases within reasonable times.
With that in mind, the procedure by which a convicted defendant seeks re-
view, following affirmance of his conviction by the highest state court, should
be by way of a "petition for review" filed in the federal appellate court. The
use of this label for this procedure avoids undesirable connotations that may
flow from calling the procedure either an "appeal" or a "petition for cer-
29. This style of appellate review in criminal cases was recommended in the NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS 135-36 (1973). The
idea was put forward for discussion at the National Conference on Appellate Justice. See Meador, Remarks:
Unified Review in Criminal Cases, 5 APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, at 86 (1975).
30. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 321, 335-37 (1973).
31. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Justice Research Program, Office for Improvements in the Administration
of Justice, P.H. ROBINSON, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE
COURT JUDGMENTS 4(c) (1979).
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tiorari." To call it an "appeal" would imply to some persons that the
appellate court is compelled to employ a review process involving the tradi-
tional full-length briefs, possibly followed by oral argument and a full-dress
opinion; in other words, "appeal" would suggest a too rigid and elaborate
process. On the other hand, to call the procedure a "petition for certiorari"
might go too far the other way; it might imply that the appellate court could
decline to look at the merits of tendered issues simply on the ground that they
lack sufficient public importance. Neither process is desirable. What is de-
sired is a procedure that lays before the appellate court the alleged federal
constitutional violations and obtains from the judges an informed judgment on
the merits of those issues, but does so through a flexible process that can be
tailored to the nature of the issues.
A "petition for review" would put the case before the federal appellate
court on its merits, just as a "petition for habeas corpus" puts a case before a
federal district court for a determination on the merits. This review process
would resemble that employed in the Supreme Court of Virginia and the
United States Court of Military Appeals.32 In each of those courts appellate
review is sought through a "petition"; a denial of the petition is a ruling on the
merits of the issues. It is not simply a discretionary refusal to review, such as
that involved in a denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
The petition process allows the court a wide leeway in designing its
internal process for examining the merits of the case. Although a denial of the
petition would be a final judgment on the merits, a grant of the petition would
give the court further options; it could in the same order dispose of the case on
its merits or it could direct further proceedings by dispatching the case to the
district court for a factual hearing, by setting it for oral argument in the
appellate court, or by calling for the submission of additional information
from the parties.
A central staff of attorneys in the appellate court would be essential to
help assure the requisite thoroughness of review of the merits on all issues and
also to assist the judges in an affirmative examination for all possible federal
defects. Central staff attorneys have become familiar adjuncts in American
appellate courts. They typically provide assistance to the judges by initially
screening cases, by preparing memoranda on the issues, and sometimes by
drafting proposed short opinions when such opinions seem appropriate. Staff
attorneys could perform all these functions for the appellate court in its
review of state criminal business. Such staff attorney assistance would enable
the appellate court to orchestrate its reviewing processes to give each case the
amount of time and thought it deserves. Some cases could be disposed of on
the papers; some would require additional evidence or other information; still
others would require oral argument in the appellate court. Some cases would
deserve more elaborate written opinions from the court than others. On all of
32. D.J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS, STAFF& PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 168-73 (1974).
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these matters, the assistance of staff attorneys would be helpful, and perhaps
essential, to the process of assuring a meaningful review by the judges them-
selves."
In general, the prerequisite for seeking Supreme Court review in a state
case-that there be a final judgment of the highest court in which a decision
could be had 34 -should also be applied to review in the federal appellate court
for a state criminal conviction. Similarly, there should be a fixed time within
which review should be sought following the final state judgment. A period of
ninety days, for example, would be reasonable. 35 However, in order to permit
this federal appellate review to be coextensive with habeas corpus review,
provisions should be made for a defendant to apply for review out of time or in
a situation in which the case has not been taken to the highest state court to
which it could have been taken. There could be unusual circumstances that
would prevent an appeal within the state system or that would prevent the
pursuit of federal appellate review within the stated time. The federal appel-
late court should be empowered to consider a case on its merits in exceptional
circumstances even though these two prerequisites have not been satisfied.
The expectation would be, however, that this consideration would not
normally be accorded unless the reasons tendered justified review in the
interests of justice.
The grand objective of the arrangement described in this article is to
provide a system of affording federal judicial review on federal issues in state
criminal cases in a way more sensible, orderly, and efficient than that now
existing through the habeas corpus process and to do so in a way that brings
the litigation to a conclusion. If the jurisdiction and procedures employed in
the federal appellate court are along the lines described above, the final judg-
ment of the federal appellate court will provide assurance that every conceiv-
able federal issue in the case has been reviewed by at least three Article III
judges.
The only remaining federal review available would be by petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court in accordance with existing certiorari proce-
dures.36 There would be no need, as a practical matter, for habeas corpus in
the district courts, and access to that process would be foreclosed. The pro-
vision in section 2244(c) of Title 2831 foreclosing habeas corpus review after a
Supreme Court decision on the merits should be amended to apply also to
these appellate court decisions. The convicted defendant would have received
33. See generally, e.g., D.J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS, STAFF & PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF
VOLUME 7-18, 31-125 (1974); J. OAKLEY & R.S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1980); Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 465 (1975).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1976).
35. This is the time provided under current Supreme Court Rules for seeking review of state court criminal
judgments. SUP. CT. R. I1(1).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 authorizes review in the Supreme Court by certiorari of any case in a court ofappeals.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1976).
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all of the federal judicial review-and more-that he would have received by a
habeas corpus petition in the district court.
Society would benefit through a clearly defined point of termination to
the litigation. State justice officials and correctional authorities would know
with confidence whether a conviction and sentence were firm, and they would
know this at a reasonably early time following the final state judgment. The
convicted defendant would likewise know with certainty that the litigation
was at an end following the federal appellate court's decision. In addition to
all of these benefits to be derived from the new arrangement, the public would
likely gain renewed confidence in the judicial process and in the system of
criminal justice, because we would again have a process that flows from initial
criminal charge, through trial and appeal, to a point of clear termination, all
within a reasonable time.

